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Calls to recognize a right of return are a recurring feature of refugee crises. 
Particularly when such crises become long-term, advocates of displaced 
people insist that they be allowed to return to their country of origin. I argue 
that this right is best understood as the right of refugees to return, not to a 
prior territory, but to a prior political status. This status is one that sees not 
just any state, but a refugee’s state of origin, take responsibility for 
safeguarding their welfare. This entitlement I characterize as an institutional 
right: a right that presupposes, and is a necessary feature of, a particular 
institution. The institution of which the right of return is an indispensible part 
is the international political system that sees authority exercised by sovereign 
states. The institutional argument for a right of refugee return presupposes 
two basic factual claims about states: they play a central role in safeguarding 
rights and they pursue exclusionary policies of border control. Importantly, 
the institutional view presupposes only that states do perform both functions, 
not that they are justified in doing so. On a purely normative level, the 
institutional account assumes little more than the moral equality of human 
beings. 
 
Introduction 
Calls to recognize a right of return are a familiar feature of refugee crises. 
Particularly when such crises become long-term, advocates of displaced 
people insist that they should be allowed to return to the country from which 
they originated. I argue that this right is best understood as the right of 
refugees to return, not to a prior place, but to a prior political status. This 
status is one that sees not just any state, but a refugee’s state of origin, take 
responsibility for safeguarding their welfare. This entitlement I characterize as 
an institutional right: a right that presupposes, and is a necessary feature of, a 
particular institution. The institution of which the right of return is an 
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indispensible part is the international political system that sees authority 
exercised by sovereign states. 
The notion that citizens should be able to return to their country of origin is 
of course widely accepted. As we will see however a right of refugee return is 
possessed by a different group of people than the right of civic return. The 
right of refugee return also remains in effect when a refugee’s state of origin 
ceases to exist. For both these reasons, refugee return and civic return are best 
viewed as different rights. A theoretical advantage of the institutional account 
of the right of refugee return (hereinafter, the right of return), is that it relies 
on parsimonious premises. The institutional argument for a right of return 
presupposes two basic factual claims about states: they play a central role in 
safeguarding rights and they pursue exclusionary policies of border control. 
Importantly, the institutional view presupposes only that states do perform 
both functions, not that they are justified in doing so. On a purely normative 
level, the institutional account assumes little more than the moral equality of 
human beings.  
Why an Institutional Right of Return? 
 A central motivation for offering a new account of the right of return is to 
address a situation of devastating loss that routinely befalls large numbers of 
people, but which receives little philosophical attention. This is the situation 
of being born stateless.1
Refugee crises all too often are multigenerational. The most well-known 
case is that of the Palestinians, but they are hardly alone.2 Members of the 
Sahrawi people, for example, were displaced from Western Sahara in 1975 
following military occupation by Morocco, and have occupied remote desert 
camps in Algeria ever since. Long exile was also the experience of the so-
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called stranded Pakistanis, speakers of Urdu who were loyal to Pakistan 
when East Pakistan seceded and became Bangladesh in 1971, after which both 
Pakistan and Bangladesh denied them citizenship for decades, until 
Bangladeshi finally accepted them in 2008. It is tragic scenarios such as these, 
in which human beings pass refugee status on to their children, that generate 
calls to recognize a right of return.3 An overdue task of political philosophy is 
to outline a version of that right that extends to natal refugees. Call this 
requirement—fundamental and all-important—the inclusive condition.  
A second motivation for an institutional right of return is to avoid the 
drawbacks that come with grounding such a right in a prior or more 
fundamental right to reside in or occupy a particular geographic territory, 
which has recently received much philosophical attention (Moore, 2015; Stilz, 
2017; Tadros, 2017; Halwani, 2008).4 An increasingly popular view now 
characterizes the right of return as a right grounded in a normatively 
significant relationship that human beings have with the places they inhabit. 
Proponents of the right to reside in or occupy a particular territory, or 
territorialists for short, thus frequently argue that the right of refugee return 
must be a right to return to the geographic place from which they were 
forcibly displaced. Territorial conceptions of refugee return however cannot 
justify a right of return for natal refugees, who may have never seen the 
territory from which their parents or grandparents were expelled. Hence the 
second condition of a right of return (one that I argue for rather than assume), 
that it not be grounded in a prior right to reside or occupy a particular 
territory, or the non-territorial condition for short. 
These motivations generate a third requirement that, while not a 
motivation per se, remains a condition the theory must meet. It is that the 
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institutional right of return have applicability to situations of state upheaval. 
The crises that produce refugees can see their state of origin undergo major 
transformations, ranging from losing territory through secession to entire 
states disappearing and being replaced by one or more successors, as the 
Soviet Union was replaced by Russia and other states. According to the 
institutional account, both successor and seceded states inherit from 
predecessor or pre-secession states the duty to uphold a right of return. Of 
course, one reason states such as Russia are designated successors to previous 
states is that they occupy common territory. But while territorial continuity 
features here as a principle of designating successor states, territorial rights do 
not. We can call this third condition, that of being applicable to situations of 
state upheaval, the upheaval condition.   
My goal is to outline a theory that meets these three conditions. In addition 
I hope to show that an institutional conception of the right of return is 
compatible with a range of views regarding the ethics of open borders and 
theories of justice more broadly. Indeed, because the present account does not 
challenge the core case for territorial rights but only its rationale for a right of 
return, the institutional right of return can in principle be embraced even by 
territorialists. 
An Institutional Right of Return 
The right of refugee return is best viewed as an aspect of the global state 
system that is needed to address the specific vulnerability of refugees, which 
is statelessness. On this approach the right of return is grounded not in our 
relationship to something as natural as place but our relationship with 
something as clearly the result of human artifice as the international state 
system. On this view return is properly understood as an institutional right. 
 5 
 Institutional rights are rights that presuppose the existence of, and are 
meant to operate within, a particular institution. 5 They can be shaped by, but 
are nevertheless distinct from, background rights, which presuppose no 
particular institutions and pertain to society, humanity or even sentient 
beings. An example of a background right is the right to bodily autonomy. As 
a moral idea it does not depend on any human creation or institution. General 
moral commitments of this kind often guide the design of political 
institutions. Were we to encounter a state that had no legislation enshrining a 
right to a fair trial, for example, we would think that it was missing a crucial 
institutional right, one that protected people from being arbitrarily 
imprisoned. And while the institutional right to a fair trail presupposes the 
more purely moral background right to bodily autonomy, the two concepts 
are obviously not synonymous, as the institutional right to a fair trial is meant 
to guide the functioning of a particular institution, the legal system.  
Legal rights are a form of institutional rights, but institutional rights need 
not be legal. Ronald Dworkin gives the example of a right of a player at a 
chess tournament to receive a point for checkmating an opponent (Dworkin, 
1978, p. 101). The institution in question is the game of chess. Unlike the legal 
system, rights that guide the functioning of chess are not directly shaped by 
background rights. We do not think for example that the judges at a chess 
tournament should award the prize purse to a particular player simply 
because she was poor. The institutional rights of chess are broadly 
autonomous from considerations of general morality, in the sense that no one 
thinks the rules of chess are generated simply by appeal to background rights.  
A right of return is best thought of as a right that applies to the institution 
of the modern state system. The birth of the state as we know it is generally 
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traced back to the late middle ages, and the Westphalian state system is often 
said to reach a turning point with the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. 6 This 
institution requires institutional rights just as much if not more so than any 
legal system, let alone a game such as chess. And as in the legal system but 
unlike chess, background moral rights necessarily guide our thinking about 
what institutional rights should apply to the global system of state 
sovereignty.  
If state sovereignty is the institution, what is the consideration of general 
political morality that backgrounds the institutional right of return? It is the 
entitlement of human beings to equal political consideration and respect. 
Such an entitlement is widely endorsed in contemporary political philosophy. 
John Rawls’s commitment to moral equality for example is evident in his 
conception of members of society as “self-originating sources of valid 
claims . . . regarded as free and equal” (Rawls 1985, p. 242-44). Utilitarians 
disagree with Rawls over what principles of justice the moral equality of 
persons entails, but they share his commitment to impartial moral concern. In 
addition to liberalism and utilitarianism, doctrines as diverse as libertarianism 
and communism are also “egalitarian” in the relevant sense. What these and 
other theories of justice share is not a commitment to economic equality but 
rather a more abstract commitment to equal moral consideration (Dworkin, 
1983). As Will Kymlicka sums it up, this is the idea that “the interests of each 
member of the community matter, and matter equally” (Kymlicka, 2002, p. 4).  
I take it for granted that human beings do not lose their entitlement to 
equal concern and respect when they become refugees. If refugees were not 
entitled to such concern it is not clear how any principles of justice could 
apply to them or on what basis violations of their rights could be protested. In 
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this way my account assumes that all human beings, at a minimum, are 
worthy of equal consideration.7 This is not to say that there can be no just 
distinction at the level of a particular state’s laws regarding citizens and non-
citizens. It is rather that the commitment to moral equality entails that 
everyone, refugees included, have interests that matter equally from the point 
of view of justice.  
If equal moral concern and respect is the main normative premise of an 
institutional right of return, such a right also relies on factual assumptions. 
One is that in the modern world, states are expected to protect moral equality 
by upholding certain responsibilities in their interactions with human beings. 
States are for example expected to respect the rights of everyone on earth: they 
cannot actively violate rights, as by for example commissioning an 
assassination, regardless of where someone is located or whether the victim is 
a citizen. When it comes to individuals subject to their jurisdiction, however, 
states are normally thought to have additional responsibilities that go beyond 
respecting rights and require actively protecting and fulfilling them. 8  
Protection requires police, courts and other legal tools designed to prevent 
rights violations by third parties, while fulfilment sees a state directly secure 
the object of a right, as when it provides health and welfare services to its 
populace. To be a citizen of a state is to be a member of a welfare community 
for which the state is expected to take special responsibility.  
Refugees are in a sense the human excess of the international state system. 
On the one hand, their country of origin either cannot or will not protect and 
fulfil their rights—and in some cases actively disrespects them. On the other 
hand, under the international state system, no other state is automatically 
compelled to grant them social membership. A central feature of state 
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sovereignty rather is the ability to determine who is allowed to become a 
member of a state’s welfare community.9 Whether they are justified in doing 
so or not, contemporary states jealously guard their memberships by 
restricting immigration. Hence the all too familiar phenomenon of refugees 
left to languish in camps for years, experiencing long periods in which they 
can exercise few of the prerogatives of citizenship. In short, if refugees are 
driven to leave their state of origin because it does not properly attend to their 
rights, other states also play a causal role in them becoming stateless by 
implementing restrictive entry policies.    
The absence of state concern for one’s basic rights is not a small loss. To be 
sure, the state is not the only institution that concerns itself with rights: 
international entities such as the United Nations and Non-government 
Organizations (NGOs) also play a role in basic rights enforcement. But the 
state today is the primary guardian of rights. There simply is no equivalent 
entity with the same power to determine whose rights will be upheld or 
disregarded. This is why refugees can undergo a significant loss in well-being 
even when they are displaced from states that do not safeguard all of their 
subjects’ rights. Even residents of an illiberal state can pursue a vocation, 
participate in a religious or cultural community and provide a safe and stable 
home to their children. While it is not axiomatic that these freedoms will 
necessarily be lost upon becoming a refugee, this is hardly a remote 
possibility either. In the modern world being recognized as a subject of a state 
is a necessary condition of being able to exercise one’s rights. 
So far as residents of refugee camps are concerned, they can take for 
granted neither that their state of origin nor the state of exile will recognize 
them as members of their respective welfare communities. The predictable 
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result, even apart from the obvious rights violation that comes with being 
physically confined to a camp, is that refugee camps exhibit high levels of 
disease, malnutrition and sexual assault (Connolly  et al., 2004; Hynes & 
Cardozo, 2000). A basic function of a right of return therefore is to restore 
refugees to the political status they lost upon becoming refugees, which is the 
status of someone accepted as a member of a welfare community whose 
rights are the responsibility of a state to uphold.  
Why Return? 
These then are the moral and political bases of the institutional right of 
return. Human beings are entitled to equal consideration and respect. States 
play a central role in securing rights. Because a refugee’s state of origin does 
not adequately concern itself with her rights and other states deny her 
membership, she experiences the extreme vulnerability of statelessness. Yet 
someone might agree with all of this and still ask why the institutional right 
refugees are entitled to should be a right of return. Refugees for example 
could become citizens of their country of exile. So perhaps Afghan refugees in 
Iranian camps should have a right to become Iranians. Alternatively, refugees 
might have a right to be resettled in a state other than the state of origin or 
exile. Why institutionalize a right of return as opposed to these or some other 
option? 
My account is not meant to suggest that refugees never have outcome 
rights other than return. But if they do, they are necessarily accompanied by a 
right of return, for four reasons. The first concerns the especially strong 
interest refugees themselves commonly have in return. Second, a right of 
return identifies a particular state tasked with admitting refugees, making it 
more efficient than alternative solutions that do not single-out a particular 
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state as bearing responsibility for protecting or fulfilling refugees’ rights. 
Third, a right of return avoids perverse incentives that can motivate states not 
to admit refugees or even to create refugees in the first place. Fourth and 
finally, the right of return is a necessary aspect of a global order in which 
immigration control, whether or not it is justified, it is a defining feature of 
international politics.   
Refugees have a strong interest in returning to their state of origin because 
it is the outcome with the greatest likelihood of seeing their previous status 
most fully restored. In returning to their state of origin refugees are more 
likely to re-establish the patterns of life that existed prior to exile. This is 
especially true in cases in which an entire population does not migrate, and 
most members of a refugee’s social network remain in the country of origin.  
Even when a large population is forced into exile, however, a refugee’s 
identity can experience unwanted change. This is because what state an 
individual resides in influences his or her political identity. Consider the 
cultural affinities between Canadians and Americans. Despite the obvious 
similarities, being Canadian is a separate identity. As Margaret Moore 
observes, “Canadians do not have a culture sharply distinct from 
Americans . . . Nevertheless, there is a quite distinct political identity in 
Canada, with distinct political aspirations” (Moore, 2015, p. 80). The existence 
of Canadian and other national identities is maintained to a significant degree 
by the existence of particular states. Given this, being forced to leave the state 
with which one identifies will make it more difficult to maintain that identity 
even when the county of exile is culturally familiar. Whether or not every last 
refugee has a strong desire to maintain their national identity, the ability to 
maintain such an identity is a reasonable entitlement of justice. Return, unlike 
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local integration or resettlement, allows human beings to interact with and be 
part of the state-defined group with which they most often politically identify.  
Of course many refugees do not end up in countries that are culturally 
familiar. It is not at all uncommon for countries that produce refugees to be 
located in neighbour states with different languages and cultures. Similarly, 
resettlement often sees refugees from the developing world brought to a 
developed state with an unfamiliar language and culture. While it is 
conceivable that a refugee might be displaced or resettled in a culturally 
familiar society, exile in an alien culture is a routine occurrence. In cases in 
which the country of exile is culturally foreign, refugees will have a further 
reason to desire return. But even when the country of origin is culturally 
familiar, a right of return protects refugees’ interest in secure membership in 
their pre-expulsion national identity, and their interest in passing that identity 
on to their children.  
The interests of refugees themselves provide the central moral justification 
for the right of return. As an institutional right, however, the right of return 
must also function efficiently within the international state system. Part of 
what makes the right of return efficient in this context—the second reason 
why such a right is necessary—is that it clearly identifies the society of 
expulsion as having a duty to re-admit refugees. This is significant for two 
different reasons.  
The first is theoretical. A prominent version of rights theory holds that 
rights necessarily generate duties of enforcement that are borne by particular 
actors or entities (Kagan, 1998, pp. 172-5; Shue, 1996, p. 39). As Onora O’Neill 
puts it, “[unless] obligation-bearers are identifiable by right-holders, claims to 
have rights amount only to rhetoric: nothing can be claimed, waived or 
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enforced if it is indeterminate where the claim should be lodged, for whom it 
may be waived or on whom it could be enforced” (O’Neill, 1996, p. 129.) The 
present account is agnostic on whether this is in fact a conceptual requirement 
of moral rights, as O’Neill and others maintain.10 Given the nature of 
institutional rights, however, it seems reasonable to require that some 
particular state be identified as the entity tasked with the duty of protecting 
or fulfilling an institutional right.11 If we think of the alternative right to 
resettlement abroad, for example, it is not immediately clear which particular 
state would be the bearer of such duties. Thus there can be no enforceable 
right of resettlement in a world of discretionary border control, according to 
this understanding of institutional rights. 
The further reason why it is significant that return immediately identifies a 
duty-bearer is practical. As noted, even if a refugee has a right to resettlement, 
this still leaves open which country in particular is obliged to accept her. In 
terms of any right actually being exercised, it makes a difference whether the 
duty of enforcement is automatically assigned somewhere, or if it is instead a 
matter to be negotiated, and so potentially delayed or evaded. A right of 
return entails that the state of origin has a non-negotiable responsibility to 
extend the prerogatives of membership to refugees. And while refugee-
producing states are sometimes reluctant to admit refugees in the aftermath 
of displacement, it is also the case that the majority of refugee camps do 
eventually close and their occupants do return home. Any means of finding a 
home for refugees requires that refugees and their advocates identify a 
potential host society. Return identifies the society of origin as the host, 
immediately designating it as an appropriate target of moral and political 
suasion by NGOs, the media, international organizations and other states. 
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Of course, the same would be true of a right to be integrated into the 
society of displacement. Unlike resettlement, but like return, a right to local 
integration would immediately identify a bearer of the duty to admit refugees. 
But this brings us to the third fundamental reason supporting a right of return. 
If refugees had a right to local integration instead of return, it would create 
two perverse incentives that would increase the probability of refugees’ rights 
being violated. 
First, powerful regimes that were prejudiced against minorities or other 
groups would have an incentive to expel them, as once they became refugees 
they would become the responsibility of the society of displacement.12 Such a 
right would thus potentially achieve the opposite outcome that a right of 
return is meant to secure: it would incentivize the creation of more, rather 
than fewer, refugees. 
Second, states that did not want to admit refugees as equal citizens would 
have a strong incentive not to host refugees to begin with. It is a sad reality 
that refugees are often not welcome. Even wealthy liberal-democratic states 
implement no-entry policies for refugees, due to a strong desire not to have to 
assume permanent responsibility for their welfare (Gibney & Hansen, 2003). 
The same motive has seen Tanzania, Thailand and other states in the 
developing world respond to the arrival of large numbers of refugees by 
denying them entry or undertaking mass expulsions (Lamey, 2011, pp. 98-9). 
A right on the part of refugees to local integration, especially one 
unaccompanied by any right of return, would give states that currently at 
least tolerate refugee camps a new motive to take extreme steps to prevent 
refugees from ever entering their territory, trapping them in crisis zones and 
possibly undermining regional stability as well.13 
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Finally, the fourth consideration supporting a right of return is that we live 
in a world of border control. Whether this arrangement is just or unjust is a 
subject of philosophical controversy (Wellman, 2008; Miller, 2015; Carens, 
2013; Heumer, 2010). The institutional account does not seek to settle this 
debate. It instead notes that, whether or not discretionary border control is 
justified in ideal terms, at the level of non-ideal reality it is a central 
contributing factor to statelessness. The fact that we do not live in a world of 
open borders is a primary reason for the existence of refugees. So long as 
states have the power to exclude and warehouse unwanted human beings, 
the conditions that give rise to statelessness will remain in force. It is not just 
that authorities in Kenya, Iran and other countries that house large number of 
refugees do not permit them to leave overcrowded camps. Even when they 
have the money, refugees normally cannot travel to other states, including 
wealthy liberal democracies, which exclude them through visa requirements 
and citizenship law (Gibney, 2004; Lamey, 2011).  
So long as those conditions remain in effect, so should a solution in the 
form of a right of return. If the case for open borders is currently controversial, 
the norm that states should protect and uphold the rights of their subjects is 
much less so. The right of return derives force from and reinforces this widely 
accepted norm, which all states currently operationalize to at least some 
degree. Insofar as the international system of sovereign states with the power 
to enforce border control makes it possible for states to reject responsibility 
for the welfare of subjects from other states, the right of return is based on the 
insistence that states have a non-negotiable responsibility for the welfare of 
their own subjects, even after they become refugees. This insistence is 
compatible with the further insistence that border control is itself an injustice. 
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All a proponent of open borders is asked to recognize is that border controls 
do in fact exist, not that they should.  
This account of the right of return does not rule out that there can be 
additional grounds supporting a right of return for particular refugees. A 
state of origin that is also the cause of a refugee exodus, as occurs most 
obviously when people are driven into exile by persecution at the hands of 
their own government, will have an additional reason to recognize a right of 
return. Return in such instances will be an acknowledgement of wrongdoing 
and perhaps also partial restitution for the injustice the same state caused by 
creating refugees in the first place.  
This consideration, however, differs from those mentioned above 
concerning loss of national identity, the need to identify a particular state 
tasked with protecting and fulfilling refugee rights, avoiding perverse 
incentives and mitigating the effects of border control. This fifth consideration 
will not apply to all refugee scenarios. People can become refugees due to 
injustices committed by states other than their own, as when their state is 
under foreign occupation. In other instances the causal chain of injustice may 
be unclear, with the role of the state of origin difficult to determine or 
distinguish from that of other actors.14 My goal is to outline a right of return 
that is universally applicable, and which does not require investigating the 
precise causes of refugee outflows, which can be subjects of controversy. For 
these reasons, while I recognize that the restitution consideration will have 
bearing on particular refugee cohorts, it does not play a justificatory role in 
my account.  
This account of the right of return views it as the right to return to the 
status of a recognized subject of one’s state of origin. Such a view stops short 
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of characterizing the right of return, by itself, as the right to return to one’s 
former address. Upon regaining their former political status refugees may 
well be able to appeal to property and other rights that entitle them to return 
to their original homes. Insofar as they can effectively exercise such rights 
however they are no longer stateless, and thus have already regained the 
status the right of return seeks to restore.  
Natal Refugees 
These then are the considerations that justify a right of return for first-
generation refugees. Crucially, the fact that many of these same 
considerations apply to natal refugees means that subsequent generations of 
refugees will also have a right of return on the institutional approach, so long 
as they continue to experience the vulnerability of statelessness.  
Statelessness does the same damage to the interests of natal refugees as it 
does to those of their parents: they too lack a state that recognizes a 
responsibility to secure their rights. Natal refugees thus have the same 
interest in escaping statelessness as their parents. Similarly, the same 
considerations of efficiency that obtain in identifying their parent’s country of 
origin as their rightful home also apply in the case of their children. There is 
once again an automatically identifiable state that meets the theoretical 
condition of being an identified obligation-bearer and which on a practical 
level can be the subject of pro-return suasion and politicking. And the 
perverse incentives that would accompany a right of local integration for their 
parents also apply to a right of local integration for natal refugees. The state of 
exile would again have an incentive to ensure they never became home to 
natal refugees, either by not permitting camps to begin with or razing them 
after a second-generation began to appear. For all these familiar reasons 
 17 
therefore, so long as subsequent generations remain stateless, they retain a 
right of return, regardless of how many generations separate them from the 
original refugee generation. 
The institutional right of return holds that descendants of refugees have the 
right to live in the state their parents fled. In this way the institutional right of 
return is conceptually distinct from the right of citizens to return to their state 
of origin. A non-refugee holidaying abroad for example has a civic right to 
return to their state of origin. The nature of the right to return however is 
different when the individual in question is a refugee. It is a separate and 
distinct right, one that is possessed by refugees rather than citizens. One reason is 
because the special deprivations refugees face means that there can be 
legitimate grounds to prioritize their return over that of non-refugees. If a 
state for example could only take in a limited number of returnees, it should 
take in holders of an institutional right of return before, say, citizens abroad in 
states in which they hold a second citizenship, where they can access state 
protection.  
A further difference between the institutional right of refugee return and 
the right of civic return is that the former necessarily extends to natal refugees 
while the latter does not. Descendants of refugees retain an institutional right 
of return so long as they remain refugees themselves. Yet the same 
conditionality requirement that extends the right of return to later generations 
simultaneously limits who can posses the right.  
Some writers on the right of return have suggested that a minimal 
condition of any plausible account is that it withhold such a right from 
descendants of refugees who are not themselves refugees. Anna Stilz cites the 
case of Germans expelled from Poland in the aftermath of World War II (Stilz, 
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2019, pp. 78-9). Their grandchildren have been accepted members of German 
society from the time of their birth, and so surely should not enjoy any 
refugee-related right of return to Poland. The institutional account clearly 
denies these descendants of German refugees a right of return to Poland, for 
the straightforward reason that they were not born into refugeehood. 
Conversely, in an alternate universe in which people expelled from Poland 
had lived in refugee camps for generations in Germany, the descendants of 
the original refugees would inherit a right of right return under the 
institutional account, as it holds that such a right is passed down through the 
generations so long as each remains stateless. 
A question raised by the institutional account that I can only gesture at 
here concerns whether a right of return extends to people who were natal 
refugees but have since by accepted by a state other than the one their 
ancestors fled. Suppose for example members of the first generation of 
Sahrawi refugees have children who are born into refugeehood in Algeria, but 
subsequently attain permanent residency or citizenship in Spain. Should they 
continue to enjoy a right of return to Western Sahara, even after they have 
escaped statelessness in this way? And would our answer change if the 
formerly natal refugees were not the children of first-generation refugees, but 
much later descendants, such as their great grandchildren? 
The institutional account maintains that natal refugees, so long as they 
remain refugees, possess a right of return, regardless of generation. It also 
suggests a default expectation that natal refugees will possess a right of return 
even after being accepted by another state. But it is arguably consistent with 
this to hold that at some number of generations removed from the original 
displacement, whether that of great grandchildren or still later, natal refugees 
 19 
who are accepted by another country should lose their right of return to their 
ancestors’ state of origin. Possible reasons for adopting such a view include 
embracing a supersession thesis, according to which, appropriate 
rectifications of injustice can evolve over time (Waldron, 1992). Or we might 
determine that after the passage of enough time, maintaining the same 
national identity as the first-generation of refugees will cease mattering to a 
significant number of refugees.15 I do not have space to assess different 
possible answers to this question and their different rationales. But even if we 
adopt the view that at some point natal refugees who regain an operative 
nationality thereby surrender their right of return, we will still have accepted 
the central claim of the institutional account: natal refugees retain a right of 
return so long as they remain stateless, regardless of generation, and 
regardless of whether their ancestor’s state of origin has legally recognized 
them as subjects.  
Limitations of Territorial Return 
This concludes my outline of an institutional right of return as it is 
possessed by both first-generation and natal refugees. I turn now to 
documenting the limitations of a territorialist conception of return, which the 
institutional account is designed to avoid. Margaret Moore is a leading 
theorist who has worked out an especially detailed account of territorial 
rights, so her argument for a right of return will serve as a representative 
example.  
The conception of territory Moore works with is political, denoting land 
over which someone has legal authority and control. According to Moore, a 
people has right to its territory that is grounded in an individual right of 
residency and a collective right of occupancy. In order to understand her 
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account of return it is necessary to briefly outline the nature of these two 
background rights. 
According to Moore, human beings have an individual right of residency 
for two reasons. First, the places we inhabit are where we form relationships, 
projects and ways of life (Moore, 2015, p. 38). A right of residency thus gives 
us control over a key condition of being able to pursue our central aims, that 
of being able to stay in the place we inhabit. Second, human beings often 
make decisions about what projects to pursue on the assumption that they 
will do so in a particular place, and that locale can influence the nature of 
their choices. The lives of Inuit hunters, coastal fishers and many other people 
are shaped by the territories that they inhabit. A right of residency thus also 
stabilizes our relationships with the places that can influence who we are. 
Turning to the collective right of occupancy, it draws force from the fact 
that territory is important to human beings on more than just an individual 
level. They also form connections to particular places as part of a group, for 
whom the land in question can inform their collective identity. That identity 
can be damaged when the group is forced from their territory or not able to 
exercise some degree of control over its character and physical appearance 
(Moore, 2015, 40). This collective interest in control over land generates 
jurisdictional rights, which are not present in the individual right of simple 
residency. The collective right of occupancy differs further from individual 
rights in that it is possessed by peoples, which are collectives that 
demonstrate a capacity for self-determination, among other necessary 
conditions. Examples range from the Inuit people of Labrador to the 
population of the United States.   
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On Moore’s view, a right of return is not a refugee-specific right. Nor is it 
synonymous with the right of citizens to return to their country of origin. It 
rather applies when either an individual right of residency or a collective 
right of occupancy is violated. A central question this account raises therefore 
is on what grounds it can generate a right of return for natal refugees, who 
have never inhabited the territory of expulsion.  
Moore wants her account to generate a right of return that is transmissible 
to at least some natal refugees. Moore qualifies her support for such a 
transmissible right of return by also endorsing a supersession thesis, 
according to which settlers in the refugees’ territory of origin can, even if their 
arrival was unjust, come to posses territorial rights of their own, rights which 
can outweigh refugees’ right of return (Waldron, 1992).16 The right of return 
however is detachable from the supersession thesis, so the latter can be left to 
one side. “These people [in refugee camps] still suffer the effects of the 
original injustice,” Moore writes in endorsing a transmissible right of return, 
“and for long-term refugees, this limbo can persist into the second generation. 
For people in this category, the proper remedy is the right of return” (Moore, 
2015, p. 147). 
Moore here refers to second-generation refugees rather than natal refugees 
per se, but let us again set this qualification aside. It is hard to see how even a 
minimally transmissible right of return does in fact follow from Moore’s 
account. Her appeal to such a right appears ad hoc, unmotivated by any 
commitment to territorial rights.   
Moore here presents the right of return as the solution to the problem of 
people forced to live in refugee camps for long periods. Moore, however, 
mischaracterizes the precise nature of that problem by claiming that it is the 
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problem of refugees not being able to “develop projects and make plans 
confident of their background [territorial] context” (2015, p. 147). Long-term 
refugee populations can often be all too confident that their territorial context 
will continue to be a camp or shantytown. Someone who has survived 20 
years in a refugee camp has been able to plan and build relationship to that 
point, and can continue doing so on the same basis until they have some 
reason to believe their situation will change.  
What multi-generational camp life deprives individuals of in short is not 
the stability of place Moore’s theory emphasizes. The deprivation instead 
consists in the quality of the life-plans open to them: their options are more 
restricted than they would be living outside a camp. Moore’s account 
however does not seek to equalize or minimize the differences between the 
territorially-enabled life plans human beings possess. The Inuit hunter’s right 
to inhabit the Arctic might seem radically limited to someone used to urban 
life, for example, but territorialism is immune to qualitative judgements of 
this kind: what is important is that human beings have a place that they 
securely inhabit. The nature of such places and the lives they make possible 
can vary as dramatically as do plans of life enabled by the Arctic and the 
jungle. Multi-generational refugee camps, sadly, can be stable territories in 
this minimal way. When it comes to natal refugees therefore, it is not clear 
how Moore’s brand of territorialism can generate even the qualified right of 
return that she endorses. 
This pessimistic conclusion is supported by three further considerations. 
First, even if Moore were correct in her characterization of the central problem 
of camp life, it would not follow that return was the proper remedy for natal 
refugees. If anything her account would seem more likely to support a right  
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of local integration in the country of exile, given that it is the only place natal 
refugees have even known. Second, Moore’s right of residency is justified in 
part by the interest human beings have in stable membership in a community. 
When entire villages and larger communities are driven into refugee camps, 
an individual right of residency can provide no reason for why any individual 
member should be released (which is perhaps why she switches her focus to 
the quality of life a camp enables). Third, refugee communities sometimes 
inhabit locations geographically distinct from those they fled. In such 
instances a natal refugee would be “returning” to a territory geographically 
unlike they one they grew up in—an outcome Moore’s view, like most 
versions of territorialism, does not support, as different landscapes make 
possible different life-plans. 
This then is the central limitation of a territorial conception of return: it 
cannot ground a right of return for natal refugees without resorting to ad 
hockery. Because I have challenged only the ability of the theory to generate a 
right of return for natal refugees and not the case for territorial rights in itself, 
one possible response to my critique would be for a territorialist to endorse 
the institutional account, thereby combining the two views. It is helpful 
however to note a second aspect of the theory in its unmixed version, less to 
show its defects than to illustrate how it and the institutional account differ in 
a fundamental manner that may not be apparent at first glace. The 
institutional account, unlike its territorial counterpart, does not seek to 
determine the appropriate restitution for all forms of injustice involving 
displacement. 
An attractive feature of theories of territorial rights is their sustained 
concern with injustices committed against indigenous peoples under 
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colonialism. One such injustice was administrative relocation. An example 
cited by Moore is the relocation of Inuit people in Canada. In 1958 and 1959 
two remote Inuit villages in Labrador saw the withdrawl of medical and other 
services that the residents had come to depend on (Brice-Bennett, 2017; Moore, 
2015, p. 41). The decision to relocate was one that the community members 
had no control over. The towns to which they were relocated were hundreds 
of miles to the south, a distance sufficient to change their way of life. Where 
they had once been able to sustain themselves through hunting, they now 
succumbed, as Moore writes, to “a culture of dependency and dislocation, 
and social ills” (Moore, 2015, p. 41). 
This case has been invoked as a challenge to the present view. “It’s hard to 
see how this [institutional] account has applicability to the case of the 
Labrador Inuit,” one anonymous referee has written, “since they are already 
in the state. Is this just a case of property rights? To be a plausible account, we 
need to consider hard cases.”17 This objection however only shows that there 
is a structural difference between territorial and institutional approaches to 
return that is easy to overlook. Institutionalism outlines a right of return 
specific to refugees. Internally displaced people do not meet the definition of 
a refugee because they are not outside their country of origin. On the 
institutional account therefore the key question to ask of internally displaced 
people is whether they experience statelessness. 
Common aspects of statelessness include not being able to legally obtain 
work or education, either for oneself or one’s children. People without the 
protection of a state cannot go to the police without fear. Many receive no 
state welfare and must rely instead on humanitarian aid. These conditions can 
all obtain even when a stateless person is not confined to a refugee camp. Had 
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the Labrador Inuit been formally denied the right to work and welfare and 
herded into camps, it would have been right, on the institutional account, for 
NGOs, the media and the Inuit themselves to press for their restoration as 
rights-bearing subjects under Canadian law. Of course we already accept that 
governments should not violate the rights of their subjects. But a right of 
return is a response to the especially severe vulnerability that is experienced 
by human being whom no state anywhere recognizes as a subject. Internally 
displaced people who experience statelessness are essentially refugees but for 
the fact they remain within their state of origin. Given the common experience 
of statelessness, they too are entitled to an institutional right of return. But for 
reasons that should now be obvious, this restoration of political status could 
occur without seeing the internally displaced return to their former places of 
residence.  
The Labrador Inuit experienced a different wrong that the withdrawal of 
state protection. After relocation they could still legally work, go to school, 
engage the police or travel within Canada. As such, they fall outside the scope 
of those whose plight the institutional account of return is meant to address. It 
hardly follows that no wrong was done to them. As noted above, the purely 
moral right that backgrounds the institutional right of return is one of equal 
consideration and respect. The Labrador Inuit were relocated as a result of a 
process that did not treat them as equals. Rather than ask whether they 
wanted to relocate, local authorities decided for them. This approach reflected 
a colonialist mindset. The fundamental moral value that grounds the 
institutional right of refugee return thus condemns the relocation on 
intuitively plausible grounds, a failure to respect the Inuit as moral equals.18  
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The institutional account also does not deny that the Labrador Inuit were 
entitled to some form of redress. Historically, the actual redress was an 
apology and a monument (CBC News, 2009). Perhaps some other form of 
redress would have been better, including the restoration of services in their 
old villages. But if they were entitled to a restoration of village services, it was 
due to rights to minority cultural support, family re-unification, property or 
other grounds that need not presuppose a need to escape statelessness. The 
institutional right of refugee return leaves open what if any other rights might 
be operative here. It does not hold that the right form of redress in every case 
must involve a return to a geographic place of origin.  
For territorialists, because administrative removal cases involve leaving a 
territory, they must be subject to the same remedy as refugee displacement. 
Territorialists in this way are hedgehogs: there is one big solution, a right of 
territorial return, that applies to all cases of displacement whether or not the 
victims experience statelessness. Institutionalists by contrast are foxes: they 
accept different solutions to different cases of displacement depending on 
whether or not they involve statelessness. The Inuit Labrador case is only a 
“hard case” therefore if one assumes that there can only be one solution to all 
forms of displacement. This issue itself however is part of what is at issue 
between territorialist and institutionalist views when the two accounts are 
taken in their own terms rather than combined. To assume the hedgehog view 
therefore is to beg the question against institutionalism.  
States of Upheaval 
The simplest case of return involves the return of a refugee to their country 
of origin. I have outlined how the institutional right of return applies to one 
kind of extension case, that of natal refugees. Refugees however take flight in 
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a wide range of scenarios, including those that see their state of origin 
undergo significant transformation. Given this, let us now consider how the 
institutional account applies to two kinds of state upheaval: that in which a 
refugee’s state of origin disappears and is replaced by a successor state; and 
that in which a refugee resides in part of a state that secedes, such that a 
refugee’s original locale or residence is now located outside their former 
country. 
The most significant transformation a refugee’s state of origin can undergo 
is to disappear. During its existence for example the U.S.S.R. produced many 
refugees. Because these “defectors” were coming from a Warsaw Pact country, 
they received a warmer reception than most other refugees, as Western states 
were keen to score a public relations victory against Stalinism (Gibney, 2004, 
p. 114, p. 177). Soviet Bloc refugees therefore generally did not experience 
long periods statelessness the way residents of refugee camps do. 
Nevertheless, for illustrative purposes, let us imagine refugees from the 
Soviet Union who were stateless at the time of the U.S.S.R.’s collapse. On the 
institutional account, Russia would have inherited the duty to admit still-
stateless Soviet refugees. 
Disappearing and being replaced by a successor is not the only way states 
can be transformed. They can also see part of their territory secede.  This was 
the backdrop to the case of the stranded Pakistanis, also known as Biharis, for 
whom both Pakistan and Bangladesh refused to take responsibility after the 
latter seceded. In such cases the institutional account holds that refugees have 
a right of return to either state. So in the Bihari case, a right of return to either 
Pakistan or Bangladesh.  
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The case for a right of return to Pakistan follows straightforwardly from 
the account presented above. If after the Bangladesh War of Independence 
there were former citizens of Pakistan now experiencing statelessness—
whether in Pakistan, Bangladesh or a third country—their transformation into 
refugees would not see them lose their right to the protection of the 
government that they formerly enjoyed. In particular, should there be any 
Pakistani refugees outside Pakistan’s borders, this fact would not be grounds 
for Pakistan to discard them or their children like refuse, writing them off as 
the responsibility of whatever state happened to house them.  
At the same time, however, the institutional understanding of return also 
generates a duty to recognize a right of return on the part of Bangladesh. 
Insofar as Pakistan still existed after Bangladesh seceded, Bangladesh was not 
the successor state to Pakistan. But Bangladesh in this context has something 
in common with successor states such as Russia, in that Bangladesh laid claim 
to a portion of Pakistan. Such cases are instances not merely of secession but 
also of split succession, insofar as one state, here Bangladesh, takes on 
authority over a portion of a state that otherwise continues to exist. If we were 
to take the entire civic community of Pakistan as it existed prior to the 
secession crisis, authority over all of its people and territory is no longer the 
responsibility of a unitary Pakistani state but is now split between Pakistan 
and Bangladesh.  
The same considerations that justify a right of return in simple cases all 
apply to states of upheaval involving successor states such as Russia. 
Refugees again have an interest in returning to their former life as a protected 
subject of a state; the right again functions efficiently as part of the 
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international state system in a manner that avoid perverse incentives; and the 
potentially devastating effects of border control are again mitigated.  
In Bangladesh-style cases involving secession, the rationale of a refugee 
returning to their previous way of life does not apply with the same force. 
Someone long resident in what was East Pakistan could “return” to what was 
formerly West Pakistan, effectively beginning a new chapter in their life as a 
citizen of Pakistan. Secession cases also do not have quite the same clarity 
regarding which state in particular is obliged to take in refugees as is true of 
simple cases: there will now be two or more states automatically obligated to 
accept return. But otherwise all the same considerations again apply. Central 
to both upheaval scenarios is that a right of return presents refugees with a 
path out of statelessness, in a manner that encourages long-term justice and 
stability in the international order. The case for return again begins from a 
norm that the majority of states already accept, responsibility for their 
subjects, rather than from a norm of open borders which, however sound it 
may be in ideal terms, is widely disputed at the level of non-ideal reality.  
What are the criteria by which one state is designated a successor to 
another, in cases of both unitary and split succession? Historically, a central 
consideration has been whether a candidate successor state is composed of 
(part of) the predecessor state’s territory, in addition to its people and assets 
(United Nations, 1978). Given the prominence of territory on this list, one 
might ask how the institutional account of return can appeal to the notion of a 
successor state in both Russia- and Bangladesh-style cases given that the 
institutional view strives to offer a non-territorial conception of return.  
The answer here is straightforward. The institutional account does not 
deny that states are territorial entities. What is seeks to avoid is basing the 
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right of return on an appeal to territorial rights. It is therefore no 
embarrassment to the institutional account if territory figures in the basis of 
designating a successor state, to which a refugee now has a right of return. 
For it was already the case when the predecessor state existed that it was 
defined in part by its territorial location. Given this, the issue of having to 
designate one or more successor states does not introduce a new role for 
territory into the theory, let alone a new role for territorial rights. 
Designating successor states in upheaval cases requires no appeal to the 
idea that human beings have a right to inhabit a particular place. Suppose for 
example that Bangladesh accepted responsibility for all Bihari refugees, but 
they ended up living somewhere other than their pre-secession residence. 
These people, just as much as Biharis who “returned” to rump-state Pakistan, 
would have exercised a right to return to their former status as a subject of a 
civic community that formerly was a component part of greater Pakistan. 
They would not have exercised a right to return to their former geographic 
territory. The institutional account does not rule out that individuals in such 
circumstances could have other grounds to return to their original homes, 
such as property restitution or family reunification. But insofar as they were 
truly accepted as members of either civic society, their statelessness would 
thereby come to and end. At that point they would attain the standing as 
permanent residency or citizenship that is a necessary condition of making 
recourse to property rights or other legal sources of restitution regarding their 
homes.  
In sum, it is possible to regain state protection by being accepted by a state 
that governs over one’s old territory without returning to the old territory 
itself. This however is not the only reason cases of state upheaval presuppose 
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no commitment to territorial rights. Territory can be used as a means of 
identifying successor and divergent-successor states for reasons unrelated to 
rights, in particular, for reasons of efficiency.  
Historians of the international state system often note that one of the 
central reasons it achieved global dominance is its greater efficiency that other 
forms of authority. It is not possible here to document the many confusing 
and dysfunctional aspects of systems of political authority that differ from the 
model of a state wielding authority within set borders and only within those 
borders (Spruyt, 1994, pp. 34-58.) But one reason sovereign states have come 
to capture every land mass on earth save Antarctica is that they clearly 
demarcate one ultimate authority.  
It was common for Medieval popes, emperors, monarchs, lords and city-
leagues to claim authority over the same person or place simultaneously. As 
historian Hendrik Spruyt has written, “the logic of feudal organization lacked 
a sovereign, a final source of authority and jurisdiction” (Spruyt, 1994, p. 38). 
Modern states by contrast exert ultimate jurisdiction within their domains. 
Domestic political life thus attains greater predictability and stability than it 
does under non-territorial systems of authority, under which it was often not 
clear who ultimately held authority. The same is true internationally. 
Sovereign states have long found it easiest to conduct foreign relations with 
other sovereign states. Historically this resulted in a “process of mutual 
empowerment,” whereby states reciprocally recognized each other’s 
sovereignty while withholding such recognition from non-states (Spruyt, 1994, 
p. 179). 
If territory is an efficient means of organizing and recognizing political 
authority to begin with, it is an even more efficient means of identifying 
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successor states within a system that is already committed to organizing 
authority territorially. Periods of state upheaval can see entire geo-political 
regions descended into chaos. A norm that clearly and unambiguously 
identifies states that inherit a duty of return is a simple and effective means of 
ensuring that chaotic periods do not see refugees lose their fundamental right 
of return, which in the final analysis is a right to return to their former status 
as a subject of a civic community, not to a particular territory.  
Above I argued that the institutional right of return differs from the right of 
civic return by extending to include natal refugees. Scenarios of state 
upheaval illustrate a second manner in which the rights of refugee return and 
civic return differ. By clearly designating states that inherit the responsibility 
to admit refugees in scenarios or state disappearance, secession and redrawn 
borders, the institutional account makes substantive claims about which the 
right of civic return is silent. Historically states have been all too willing to use 
situations of state upheaval as an excuse to disregard the rights of an 
unpopular minority. The institutional right of return identifies which 
particular states have the duty to admit refugees in such scenarios in a way 
that general affirmations of civic return do not. 
The institutional account of return seeks to function as part of the 
international state system. Yet while that system sees states wield power 
territorially, this is ultimately an incidental feature of states on the 
institutional account. We can see this by noting the applicability of an 
institutional right of return to non-territorial forms of political authority. So 
imagine a world in which there are no states. Political authority is exercised 
instead by bands of nomads who range over a vast and diverse landmass, 
larger even than that over which Ghengis Khan once rode. There is an internal 
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structure of authority within each band, such that that some members 
function as the ultimate arbiter of political matters. Such matters might 
include the distribution of resources within the band, whether they will go to 
war with other bands and which members of these other bands will be 
recognized as rightful sovereigns. In this and other ways, the nomad leaders 
perform functions currently performed by states. Now imagine a crisis that 
sees some members of a given band become isolated and forced to live in 
refugee-like conditions. Perhaps for example there were ways of earning a 
living, participating in political life or educating their children that were 
available to them when they rode with the band, but now, abandoned in some 
wasteland, these goods, like the good of mobility itself, are lost to them.  
An institutional right of return is applicable to the imaginary nomadic 
world. It would hold that refugee-nomads had a right to return to their 
original band. Or, if the band had split, to either successor band. The rationale 
for such a right of return would be the same as offered above. They are 
human beings who have been deprived of a basic level of political protection 
and recognition that is provided by sovereign entities. The only difference is 
that the sovereign entities are mobile rather than territorial. It so happens that 
in our world the political entities that exercise sovereignty are territorial states. 
But what is essential to the institutional account of refugee return is their 
sovereignty, not their territoriality. 
A Liberal Spirit 
The institutional account of return seeks to extend the right of return to 
natal refugees, to avoid appeal to territorial rights and to be relevant to 
situations of state upheaval. The fact that it reaches these conclusions from 
widely shared normative premises however means that it can in principle also 
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be endorsed by a broad range of views, up to and including those that 
endorse territorial rights. In this way it shares the spirit of Rawlsianism and 
other liberal philosophies that seek to outline principles of justice that can be 
embraced by proponents of reasonably diverse religious, moral—and in this 
case, political—views (Rawls, 1993). 
Consider theories that endorse and oppose a state’s right to limit 
immigration. The institutional account recognizes as a matter of fact that 
states do have this power, but it is silent on whether or not it is justified. This 
silence means that both proponents and critics of open borders can in 
principle endorse an institutional right of return. The need for a right of 
return in a world of open borders is unclear, as refugees could potentially 
resettle in any state other than their state of origin. Perhaps however even in 
such a world there would be need for such a right, so long as states retained 
the power, even if they did not exercise it very often, to turn away needy 
migrants. The fact that we do not live in such a world, however, is sufficient 
grounds to endorse an institutional right of return, the need for which can be 
separated from the question of whether or not immigration control is 
legitimate at the level of ideal justice.  
The same is true of theories that endorse and oppose the legitimacy of the 
state. So far as the institutional account of a right of return is concerned, the 
essential point again is that states do in fact play a central role in guaranteeing 
rights, whether or not they should, and whether or not their own territorial 
claims are justified. Thus even an anarchist can recognize an institutional 
right of return as a necessary instrument of non-ideal justice.19 The 
institutional account presumes that human beings warrant equal moral 
consideration and respect, and that a state-based system of international 
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justice is one step closer to justice with a right of refugee return than without. 
Such judgments can be affirmed even by those who doubt the justice of the 
state system itself.  
Finally, the institutional account is compatible in principle with some form 
of territorialism. The criticisms of territorialist accounts offered above focused 
on their implications for refugee return rather than the core concept of 
territorial rights. There may be no contradiction in the thought that human 
beings possess territorial rights and one or more institutional rights particular 
to the institution of state sovereignty. I make no assumption that taking on 
board an institutional right of return would leave a theory of territorial rights 
unchanged. But there is no reason in principle why an institutional right of 
return must necessarily function as an external threat, rather than congenial 
supplement, to some version of territorial rights. 
Conclusion 
“The first loss,” Hanna Arendt famously wrote of refugees, “was the loss of 
their homes, and this meant the loss of the entire social texture into which 
they were born in which they established for themselves a distinct place in the 
world” (Arendt, 2004 [1951], p. 372). For decades, passages such as this have 
been read as characterizing a refugee’s most fundamental loss as a loss of a 
physical place. If the present account is correct, however, there is another way 
to conceive of refugee’s lost “place in the world.” It is the sense a member of a 
nomadic band, for example, would use is saying that her “place” was with the 
band that had long included her as a member. “Place” in this sense is a 
political, not a geographic, concept. The institutional account holds that 
refugees, wherever they may be found, possess the right to return to their 
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place in a system in which upholding fundamental rights is the responsibility 
of states.  
This defence of an institutional right of return arrives at a time when 
scholars of refugee issues devote increasing attention to alternatives to return 
(Adelman & Barkan, 2011; Long, 2013). One motivation for exploring such 
alternatives is that return to the state of origin is often politically impossible. It 
can however be true that we have a right to do something that political 
conditions prevent us from doing, and nothing in the institutional account 
denies that pursuing options other than return will sometimes be necessary 
(Lamey, 2020). But history suggests that a right of return is no small 
entitlement. Basic human rights have been called “the morality of the depths. 
They specify the line beneath which no one is allowed to sink” (Shue, 1996, p. 
18.) The right of return is ultimately a morality of the lower depths. It seeks to 
ensure that when human beings do fall below the line, or, worse, are born 
beneath it, they do not sink below the point of no return.20  
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1 The form of statelessness I have in mind is de facto, as when refugees cannot 
take for granted that the law will protect their rights, even through they have 
not been formally denationalized. Statelessness can also be de jure, as when 
refugees, in addition to experiencing this same form of vulnerability, are also 
formally stripped of their citizenship. 
2 Beyond return, the Palestinian case involves the issue of creating a 
Palestinian state, which I leave aside. 
3 For affirmations of the right of return of Sahrawi and Pakistani refugees see 
The Norwegian Support Committee for Western Sahara (2008) and Sen (2000). 
4 For a helpful taxonomy of theories of territorial rights see Ypi (2013a). 
5 My account of institutional rights follows Dworkin (see Dworkin, 1978, pp. 
101-5). 
6 For the rise of the international state system see Spruyt (1994) and Philpott 
(2001).  
7 As a minimum because proponents of equal moral consideration can differ 
on whether animals are also subjects of justice. For the view that they are see 
Cochrane (2018). 
8 For the historical development of states’ tripartite duty regarding rights see 
Koch (2012). 
9 For the diverse components that constitute sovereignty see Krasner (1999).  
10 For criticism of O’Neill’s view see Kuosmanen (2013). 
11 The international state system can give rise to institutional rights that are 
secured, not through protection or fulfilment, but the third option mentioned 
above, respect. Although I do not have space to explore it here, I am drawn to 
the possibility that the right of non-refoulement, or the right of refugees not to 
be returned to states where they have a well-founded fear of persecution, is 
an institutional right of this kind. If non-refoulement is an institutional right 
that is upheld through respect, however, then it will not require a particular 
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obligation-bearer to be identified among states: rather all states will be 
required to refrain from returning refugees to danger. Given the possibility of 
institutional rights with this structure, I do not go so far as to say all 
institutional rights within the state system must have duties of enforcement 
that are borne by particular states: only institutional rights that are secured 
through protection and fulfilment must be particularized in this way.  
12 This is a major weakness of Adelman and Barkan’s (2011) argument that the 
right of return should be replaced with a purely pragmatic approach to 
refugee settlement, one that would decide on return, local integration or 
resettlement on a case by case basis (see Adelman & Barkan, 2011, pp. 220-36). 
For criticism see Lamey (2020).  
13 Some readers might worry, as an anonymous referee does, that “to 
prioritize the right of return is to create perverse incentives for states of refuge 
to delay or deny access to their nationality to refugees.” Given this, one might 
think what refugees really deserve is a right to an operative nationality, which 
can be regained through return, local integration or resettlement. In response, 
I note that my account does not entail that return is always the best outcome 
to seek in practice. We can have rights that it is sometimes not possible to act 
on, and there will be cases in which local integration or resettlement are more 
prudent and realistic goal. Regarding a right to an operative nationality, it 
faces the same problem as a right of resettlement, discussed above: no state in 
particular would bear a non-negotiable responsibility for fulfilling it 
(bestowing nationality on someone is here seen as a right that cannot be 
upheld merely through respect, and instead requires fulfilment). Also, insofar 
as a right to an operative nationality made a state of refuge potentially rather 
than automatically the bearer of a permanent duty to uphold the rights of 
refugees, it risks the perverse incentive problem outlined above. In the 
Tanzanian case, for example, Tanzania denied entry to approximately 20,000 
refugees seeking entry from Burundi in 1995. A right to an operative 
nationality that makes states of refuge potential bearers of permanent duties 
to any refugees who cross their borders risks exacerbating the international 
trend of no-entry policies, which is already a serious problem. This possibility 
of this occurring might be reduced by affirming a refugee right to local 
integration in addition to, rather than instead of, a right of return. I do not have 
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space to explore this possibility here. But even if this view proves correct, it 
still suggests the need for a right of return. 
14 Gibney (2004, p. 7) notes that some definitions of refugee include people 
forced to flee deadly viruses such as Ebola. My account leaves open the 
possibility of refugees needing a right to return to a state from which they 
were displaced by a virus, which was able to spread despite the state in 
question acting justly (e.g. the state lacked adequate resources, or a wealthy 
outside state would not share a cheap vaccine).  
15 A hypothesis that Chatty (2013) suggests is at odds with the experience of 
Sahrawi and Palestinian refugees to date. 
16For criticism of Waldron’s supersession thesis see Simmons (2016, pp. 153-
86). 
17 According to the referee, “I was rather attracted to the territorialist position 
but I think the right of residency is individualist in the sense that it is simply a 
right to remain in the place where one resides, if one resides there not 
unjustly.” For a theory of territory similar to the one the referee affirms see 
Stilz (2017). 
18 For a characterization of colonialism as a failure to respect moral equality 
see Ypi (2013b).  
19 Refugees are by definition outside their state of origin. In a stateless world 
there would therefore be no refugees and so no need for a specific right of 
refugee return. Human beings could still experience rights violations, but the 
specific vulnerability of statelessness as it occurs in the modern world, which 
presupposes the existence of states with the power to exclude, would not 
occur. 
20 I am grateful to referees at three journals for their comments, but above all 
to a referee at this journal for some especially constructive suggestions. 
